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Peer punishment of free-riders (defectors) is a key mechanism for promoting
cooperation in society [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. However, it is highly unstable since some
cooperators may contribute to a common project but refuse to punish defectors.
Centralized sanctioning institutions (for example, tax-funded police and crimi-
nal courts) can solve this problem by punishing both defectors and cooperators
who refuse to punish. These institutions have been shown to emerge naturally
through social learning and then displace all other forms of punishment, includ-
ing peer punishment [6, 7]. However, this result provokes a number of questions.
If centralized sanctioning is so successful, then why do many highly authoritar-
ian states suffer from low levels of cooperation? Why do states with high levels
of public good provision tend to rely more on citizen-driven peer punishment?
And what happens if centralized institutions can be circumvented by individual
acts of bribery? Here, we consider how corruption influences the evolution of
cooperation and punishment. Our model shows that the effectiveness of central-
ized punishment in promoting cooperation breaks down when some actors in the
model are allowed to bribe centralized authorities. Counterintuitively, increasing
the sanctioning power of the central institution makes things even worse, since
this prevents peer punishers from playing a role in maintaining cooperation. As
a result, a weaker centralized authority is actually more effective because it al-
lows peer punishment to restore cooperation in the presence of corruption. Our
results provide an evolutionary rationale for why public goods provision rarely
flourishes in polities that rely only on strong centralized institutions. Instead,
cooperation requires both decentralized and centralized enforcement. These re-
sults help to explain why citizen participation is a fundamental necessity for
policing the commons.
A centuries-old debate exists on how to best govern society and promote cooperation: Is
cooperation best maintained by a central authority [8, 31], or is it better handled by more
decentralized forms of governance [9, 10]? The debate is still unresolved, and identifying
mechanisms that promote cooperation remains one of the most difficult challenges facing
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society and policy-makers today [10].
Decentralized, individual sanctioning of non-cooperators (also known as free-riders or
defectors) is one of the main tools used by societies to promote and maintain cooperation
[11]. Individuals can sanction free-riders implicitly via behavioral reciprocity (as in the case
of the highly successful tit-for-tat strategy [4]), or explicitly via costly punishment [12]. Both
of these forms of peer punishment have been widely studied using evolutionary models and
behavioral experiments [1, 2, 3, 4, 5].
Recently, however, Sigmund et al. [6] showed that centralized institutions can have an
evolutionary advantage over peer punishment because, unlike peer-punishers, these insti-
tutions may eliminate “second-order” free-riding. Second-order free-riders cooperate with
other players, but they do not pay the cost of punishing defectors, and this can allow de-
fectors to re-emerge [13, 14, 15]. To address this problem, Sigmund et al. present a model
of “pool” punishment, where agents commit resources to a centralized authority that sanc-
tions free-riders [6, 7]. Pool punishment avoids the second-order free-rider problem because
the centralized authority also punishes individuals who do do not punish, either directly or
by contributing to the pool. This allows pool-punishers to quickly take over a population,
displacing both free-riders and peer-punishers [6]. These advantages help to explain why
human societies frequently delegate punishment to centralized institutions [6, 16, 7]. They
also help explain why centralized institutions acquire an increasing monopoly over legitimate
punishment over time by stigmatizing [17] and criminalizing [18, p. 371-372] various forms
of peer punishment.
However, the dominance of pool punishment in the Sigmund et al. model [6] also cre-
ates three puzzles. First, the results imply that increasing the severity of centralized pool-
punishment always increases cooperation. Yet many authoritarian states, which have the
ability to severely punish citizens, suffer from low levels of participation and public goods
provision [19]. Meanwhile states with high levels of public goods, such as western democra-
cies [19, 20, 21], typically limit the government’s ability to punish individuals and tolerate
more forms of peer punishment.
Second, centralized pool punishment quickly takes over a population and completely
displaces peer punishment [6] in the Sigmund et al. model [6], but many (if not most) societies
exhibit a mix of centralized and decentralized punishment strategies. Even in societies with
centralized punishment, citizens engage in costly acts of protest against agents who harm the
public good. As recent events—from the Occupy protests to the Arab Spring—illustrate, this
occurs even when the government punishes protestors [22, 23, 24]. What unmodeled factors
might allow peer punishment to evolve alongside centralized enforcement institutions—even
when these institutions are actively hostile towards various forms of peer punishment?
Third, the Sigmund et al. model [6] assumes that the centralized authority punishes
all forms of peer punishment. This is because peer-punishers in their model, by definition,
do not contribute to the centralized authority. However, many societies with centralized
enforcement also recognize certain forms of peer punishment as legitimate. For instance,
civil litigation, jury duty, anti-incumbent voting, and other forms of political participation
are also instances of altruistic peer punishment [25, 26, 27]. In these and other cases, citizens
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engage in a hybrid peer-pool punishment strategy. These individuals pay taxes to a central
authority, but also engage in selective acts of peer punishment that are individually costly,
but not punished by a central power. Given all the costs they bear, it is unclear how such
hybrid strategies may evolve.
Here we show that allowing for corruption in the model can help explain both why
societies want to limit the severity of centralized punishment, and why peer punishment
frequently evolves alongside centralized punishment institutions. We investigate the effect
of corrupt players who can bribe a central authority to avoid punishment. The results
show that when pool-punishers dominate a system, the central authority becomes a single
point of failure, which is highly vulnerable to corruption. This gives an opportunity for
individuals playing a hybrid peer-pool strategy to evolve because peer punishment becomes
relatively more effective under these circumstances by helping to increase the overall level of
cooperation.
In sum, given the possibility of corruption, Leviathans can promote cooperation, but
only if they also allow individuals to take action against actors who harm the public good.
Our model therefore provides an evolutionary rationale for why public goods provision and
cooperation rarely flourish in polities with strong centralized punishment alone. Instead,
cooperation rests on an authority that protects a fundamental aspect of civil society, citizen
participation in policing the commons [28, 29].
Our baseline model is a public good game (PGG) with both peer and pool punishment
[6]. The PGG is a simple model for studying contributions to a project with non-excludable
positive externalities, which may include everything from the provision of social insurance
to the protection of the environment. Let M denote the population size and let N ≤ M
denote the number of individuals who are randomly chosen in a given round to play a
public good game. In the game, each individual is faced with a choice: whether or not to
contribute a fixed amount, c > 0, to the common pool. Once each individual chooses her
action, each individual will obtain rcNc
N
, where r is a factor greater than 1, Nc is the number
of contributors to the common pool, and N is the total number of participants (whether
they contributed or not). If all individuals contribute, Nc = N , then the social welfare is
maximized and each individual obtains rc. However, each actor gains an equal share of
rcNc
N
, whether or not they contribute, making it a dominant strategy for each individual to
free-ride by contributing 0 (the payoffs are written explicitly in the SI).
The population includes X cooperators, who contribute c, and Y defectors (free-riders),
who do not. Consistent with previous work, we also assume the game is not compulsory
and some players may choose not to participate in the PGG [6, 30, 32, 33, 34]. These loners
earn a fixed small pay-off, σ. In addition, W peer-punishers cooperate by contributing c to
the PGG, but also impose a fine, β, on each free-rider at a cost γ [11]. In other words, each
free-rider pays a total fine βNw, where Nw is the number of peer-punishers in the group,
and every peer-punisher incurs an extra cost γNf , where Nf is the number of free-riders
in the group. We also have V pool-punishers who, instead of directly punishing free-riders,
contribute a fixed amount, G, to a punishment pool before participating in the game and
then contribute c to the PGG. Those who do not contribute to the pool (both free-riders and
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peer-punishers) are then fined BNv each, where Nv is the number of pool-punishers in the
group. We also introduce C corruptors to the model. A corruptor pays the central authority
a fixed fee KG to avoid being punished for not contributing to the PGG (this only makes
sense if the fee is less than the total contributions paid by pool-punishers, KG < G+ c).
We study the equilibria of fully mixed populations of fixed size M and variable composi-
tion by computing the pay-offs obtained by players using these strategies, assuming agents
play in randomly sampled groups of size N . The difference in payoffs, together with the
parameter s ≥ 0, determine the rate at which individuals with lower payoffs are replaced by
types with higher payoffs. As in other evolutionary models, this process can be interpreted
either as evolution or social learning. We also allow for random switching of strategies with
a mutation rate µ ≥ 0. We derive equilibria as the long-run distribution of different strate-
gies both analytically (in the limit of strong imitation) and using numerical simulation. For
details, see the Supplementary Information (SI).
Figure 1 shows sample runs of a numerical simulation of the model. Without corruption,
pool punishment eventually takes over the population [6], and does so even earlier when B,
the severity of second order pool punishment, is higher.
The situation changes dramatically when we introduce corruptors. Pool punishment is
no longer a dominant strategy, as shown in a sample simulation run (Figure 1(c)). Inter-
estingly, Figure 1(d) shows that weakening pool punishment (lowering the fine B) allows
peer-punishers to re-emerge as a relatively stable strategy that restores cooperation in the
presence of corruption.
We investigate this further in Figure 2, which shows the proportion of different strategies
as a function of second-order punishment severity. For low values of B, peer-punishers
dominate and prevent the corruptor strategies from gaining ground. As B increases, peer-
punishers disappear and pool-punishers become more prevalent. However, with even higher
values of B, the prevalence of corruptors also increases. This causes the total number of
cooperative individuals to decline. We confirm these results by analytical computation of
the long run frequencies of strategies in the (X, Y, Z, V,W,C) sub-population (for methods
see SI). With low B, the frequencies, respectively, are 1
M+7
[1, 2, 2, 1,M, 1], confirming the
clear dominance of peer-punishers (with a population of M = 100 this is approximately
[0.01, 0.02, 0.02, 0.01, 0.93, 0.01]). Strong central punishment, however, yields the distribution
[0.034, 0.114, 0.204, 0.352, 0.102, 0.193], i.e. ineffective (corrupted) pool-punishers dominate,
followed by loners and corruptors.
Strong centralized punishment allows corruptors to exploit pool-punishers in two ways:
Pool-punishers contribute to a public good, while at the same time funding a flawed institu-
tion that corruptors use to their advantage. Weak centralized punishment, on the other hand,
provides an opportunity for peer-punishers to counteract both corruptors and defectors.
Lastly, we introduce H hybrid punishers. In addition to contributing c to the public
good, individuals using this strategy pay both γ to punish defectors directly, as well as G to
the punishment-pool, and as such they are not punished by the central authority. Hybrid
individuals can be thought of as upstanding citizens that pay their taxes, but also engage in
forms of ‘legitimate’ peer sanctioning.
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Figure 3 shows that, unlike peer punishment alone, this hybrid strategy dominates the
population when centralized punishment is severe. This occurs even though the hybrid
strategy pays a higher average cost compared to pool-punishers. Setting M = 100, the
long-run distribution of strategies in the (X, Y, Z, V,W,C,H) sub-population is
[0.001, 0.004, 0.008, 0.013, 0.004, 0.007, 0.96]
As a consequence, a high level of cooperation is maintained across all levels of centralized
punishment.
Of course, one might wonder why individuals would create a second-order punishment
institution in the first place, as Figure 3 also shows that second-order punishment does not
increase the overall level of cooperation; nor does it make cooperation significantly more
stable than peer-punishment alone. Our relatively simple model is unlikely to fully answer
this very general question, as we have left out many features which could cause centralized
institutions to remain advantageous. For example, these institutions might aggregate views
on who should be punished; and, this aggregation could cause perceptual errors (which are
not in our model) to cancel out [35].
It is also possible that institutions may further evolve to deal with this remaining in-
stability. Analytical results in the SI show that when second-order punishment is strong,
hybrid punishers are only destabilized by neutral-drift towards pool-punishers (who then
allow corruptors and defectors to emerge). Institutions may therefore want to screen and
punish pure pool-punishers; and, it is interesting that many justice systems have evolved
rules that fine people who merely pay their taxes, but do not register for various forms of
hybrid punishment, such as jury duty.
Importantly, however, we have shown that simply adding the risk of corruption can
help explain why centralized and decentralized forms of punishment frequently co-exist. No
additional appeal to civic norms or civic culture is needed. Which is not to say these things do
not exist, or that they do not further promote citizen participation in policing the commons.
Rather, our model shows that independent of other virtues, peer-punishment strategies can
have a fitness advantage over pool-punishment alone. In the face of corruption, peer and
hybrid punishment strategies better promote cooperation because they are competitive. If
one punisher fails to punish a corrupt individual, another might step in; and, this result may
help to explain why polities who want to control corruption and promote cooperation often
become more tolerant of various forms of decentralized sanctioning [36].
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Figure 1: Sample simulation runs showing the effect of the corruptor strategy. For all the
runs, the following parameter values were used (please refer to the supplementary material
for more details): S = 100000,M = 100, N = 5, µ = 0.001, σ = 1.0, C = 1.0, R = 3.0, β =
0.7, γ = 0.7, K = 0.5, and G = 0.7. The severity of institutional punishment is controlled
via parameter B which is set to either 0.7 or 7. In (a), without the corruptor strategy, the
results are consistent with the results reported in the previous work [6], where pool-punishers
predominate. In (b), the predominance of the pool-punishers becomes decisive as the severity
of the institutional punishment escalates. In (c), with the corruptor strategy added to the
mix of available strategies, and with the severity of institutional punishment set to (B = 7),
the pool-punishers are no longer stable and cooperation deteriorates in general. Finally, in
(d), as institutional punishment becomes more lenient, peer-punishers emerge and largely
maintain cooperation (B = 0.7), even in the presence of corruptors.
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Figure 2: Stationary distributions of strategies as a function of institutional punishment
severity (parameter B), with the corruptor strategy included in the set of available strate-
gies. Here we observe the adverse effect of institutional punishment. The greater B, the
greater the percentage of corruption. A clear phase transition happens when B > M−1
N−1G,
when the expected punishment exerted by a single pool-punisher (in a sample of N) exceeds
the punishment cost for the pool-punisher, G. This allows a pool-punisher to severely sup-
press peer-punishers, which in turn allows corruptors, defectors, and loners to grow in the
population.
9
10-1 100 101 102
Punishment Strength (B)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Pr
op
or
tio
n
B= G
N−1 B=
M−1
N−1G
HY
BR
IDCO
OP
ER
AT
EPE
ER
PO
OL
LO
NE
RC
OR
RU
PT
DE
FE
CT
Figure 3: Stationary distributions of strategies as a function of institutional punishment
severity (parameter B), with both the corruptor and the hybrid strategies included in the
pool of available strategies. Hybrid strategies contribute to the punishment pool, but also
engage in peer punishment (without being sanctioned for it). As a result, increasing B
no longer back-fires, and the same level of cooperation is maintained. The hybrid strategy
becomes dominant for B > M−1
N−1G, when the expected punishment exerted by a single peer-
punisher (in a sample of N) exceeds the punishment cost for the pool-punisher, G. The
first transition occurs for B > G
N−1 , when the punishment imposed by a single pool-punisher
exceeds the cost in a sample of N players.
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Supplementary Materials:
Corruption Drives the Emergence of Civil Society
1 Calculation of Stationary Distribution
Our model of cooperation follows the common formulation of evolutionary dynamics simulations [1].
Specifically we consider a set of M agents each subscribing to one of d strategies. At each time step a
random sample of N agents are chosen to play a public goods game. The payoffs received by each agent
are determined by the number of each type of strategy. At each time step 2 agents are randomly chosen
and their payoffs are compared. The probability of one agent imitating the other is determined by a
logistic function of the difference in payoffs and an imitation strength s. There is also a small probability
µ that a randomly chosen agent will undergo a mutation to a different strategy.
In order to calculate the stationary distribution of strategies in our evolutionary dynamics we consider,
in common with previous work on life-death processes [2], the rates of transitions between homogeneous
states in which all agents subscribe to a single strategy. Under deterministic dynamics these homogeneous
states may be absorbing i.e. Once cooperation has collapsed and defectors have taken over, the system
cannot return to a homogeneous state of cooperators. However random mutation allows mixing between
homogeneous states via mutation and subsequent fixation.
Consider a population of agents each subscribing to strategy X. The probability that the system
makes the transition to the state of all agents subscribing to a different strategy Y depends on the
product of two quantities;
1. The probability that a random mutation introduces an agent with strategy Y (µX,Y )
2. The probability that this single mutant can invade the population and lead all agents to switch to
strategy Y ; this is known as the fixation probability (ρX,Y ).
In this formulation we assume that the mutation rate is low so that each mutation event leads either
to fixation of a new homogeneous state or reversion to the same homogeneous state before the next
mutation event occurs. Therefore, at any given time, at most two strategies are present.
Addressing (1), mutations occur in the population at a rate µ. The resultant strategy is chosen from
the d− 1 other strategies at random, giving a mutation probability
µX,Y =
µ
(d− 1) (1)
Addressing (2), the fixation probability can be expressed explicitly from the product of the probability
of each agent, after the first mutant agent, successively imitating the invading strategy. This requires
a detailed description of the payoffs and imitation probabilities (section 1.2). Alternatively, (2) can be
inferred simply in the limit of strong imitation (section 1.1).
Once we have an expression for the transition matrix between the homogeneous states, we can find
the stationary distribution of the system of agents as the dominant eigenvector. This is a vector of values
of size d which represents the long run probabilities of finding the system in a given state. We require
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that the transition matrix T be row normalised i.e. If the system is found in state X it must either
remain in state X or transition to state k 6= X. Because the stationary distribution tells us the relative
proportions of each state and the fact that the mutation probability does not depend on the source or
target states, the actual numerical value of µ is not important and it is convenient to omit it from T .
For a simple system of d = 3 states X,Y and Z representing cooperators, defectors and non-
participants respectively, we can construct T
T =

1− 12ρX,Y − 12ρX,Z 12ρX,Y 12ρX,Z
1
2ρY,X 1− 12ρY,X − 12ρY,Z 12ρY,Z
1
2ρZ,X
1
2ρZ,Y 1− 12ρZ,X − 12ρZ,Y
 (2)
The factor of 12 corresponds to
1
d−1 .
1.1 Strong Imitation Limit
The individual entries of T can be populated by simple arguments under the limit s → ∞ (and under
suitable conditions for other parameters such as punishment strength or cost) so that a strategy with a
superior payoff will always be imitated and an inferior payoff will not. There are in fact only 3 possible
values for the fixation probabilities ρi,j
ρi,j = 0: If Pj < Pi for a single mutant with strategy j, then the mutation cannot invade and the fixation
probability is 0.
ρi,j = 1: If Pj > Pi for a single mutant with strategy j, then the mutation is beneficial and induces transition
to a homegenous state j
ρi,j =
1
2
: This is peculiar to a single cooperator attempting to invade non-participants. The non-participants
receive a fixed payoff of σ but a single cooperator will also receive a payoff σ since she has no partner
with which to participate in a PGG. At the next imitation event involving the mutant cooperator,
the cooperator will have the opportunity to imitate a non-participant. Since the payoffs are identical,
the cooperator will revert to a non-participant with probability 12 , but is equally likely to convert
a non-participant to cooperation under a neutral drift. Once two or more cooperators are present,
this strategy is dominant and they invade with probability 1.
Our intuitive understanding of PGGs tells us that in the absence of punishment, free-riding always
pays (ρX,Y = 1) and that unilateral cooperation in the face of defection does not (ρY,X = 0). When
cooperation is underway, it pays to participate (ρX,Z = 0) and due to the argument above, cooperators
are slow to take over non-participants (ρZ,X =
1
2 ). Finally, if no-one is playing the PGG then something
is better than nothing (ρY,Z = 1 and ρZ,Y = 0). Therefore T reduces to
T =

1
2
1
2 0
0 12
1
2
1
4 0
3
4
 (3)
Leading to a stationary probability
[
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
2
]
; the systems spends half of its time in a state of non-
participation and an equal one quarter both as all cooperators or defectors. Intuitively there is a single
2
cycle from full cooperation, which may only be invaded by defectors (under the assumption that σ < NcrN−1 ).
Defectors in turn may only be invaded by non-participants. Once in a state of full non-participation, the
population may only slowly be invaded by cooperators due to the argument above leading to a fixation
probability of 12 . Therefore non-participation predominates over long time averages as seen in simulation.
1.2 Explicit Calculation of Transition Probabilities (Intermediate Imitation
Strength)
The dynamics of the evolution of cooperation amongst a finite-sized population of agents diverges from the
behaviour of mean-field treatments such as replicator dynamics. Now the stochastic effects of mutation
become significant [3]. The fixation probability of an l mutant in an otherwise homogeneous population
of k agents, (2), can be calculated explicitly from the theory of birth-death processes [1] as
ρk,l =
1
1 +
∑M−1
q=1 Π
q
Nl=1
τl→k(Nl)
τk→l(Nl)
(4)
Where M is the size of the population and the number of agents with strategy k or l respectively
is given by Nk and Nl with M = Nk + Nl. Here τl→k(Nl) represents the probability that one of the
Nk players will convert to strategy l via imitation. This transition probability for a single agent can be
written explicitly for a Moran process obeying a logistic imitation probability.
τl→k(Nl) =
Nl
M
M −Nl
M
1
1 + exp [−s(Pk − Pl)] (5)
Where s is the imitation strength and Pk and Pl are the payoffs of strategies k and l which depend
on the number of k and l players. Thankfully the fixation probability simplifies to
ρk,l =
1
1 +
∑M−1
q=1 exp[−s
∑q
Nl=1
(Pk − Pl)]
(6)
Although there is no analytical expression for this at intermediate values of s, the sums can be readily
evaluated and the entries of T calculated. In turn the stationary distribution can be calculated.
Henceforth, unless otherwise specified, we use the following parameter values.
PGG contribution c 1.0
PGG multiplier r 3.0
Population size M 100
Sample size N 5
Imitation strength s 1000
Non-participation payoff σ 0.1
Pool punishment effect B 0.7
Pool punishment cost G 0.7
Peer punishment effect β 0.7
Peer punishment cost γ 0.7
Bribe as proportion of tax K 0.5
3
2 Replicating Results of Sigmund et al
Sigmund et al [4] calculate the stationary distributions of their simulations in an analagous way. However
the introduction of new punishing strategies introduces a fourth possible value for the fixation probability.
When a peer-punishing mutant arises in a homogeneous population of cooperators, there is neutral drift
since peer-punishers have no-one to punish so enjoy the same benefits as cooperators with no additional
costs. This leads to a fixation probability of 1M [1]. In this scheme, the possible strategies are:
Cooperators (X): Participate and contribute c to the PGG
Defectors (Y ): Participate but do not contribute to the PGG
Loners (Z): Neither participate nor contribute to PGG
Peer Punishers (W ): Participate and contribute to the PGG (cooperate) and pay a fixed cost per
defector γ to punish defectors if encountered (the more the defectors, the more the cost).
Pool Punishers (V ): Participate and contribute to the PGG (cooperate) and pay a fixed a prior cost
G toward a punishment pool (central authority), which will punish defectors if defectors appear.
The payoff is determined by choosing a sample population of size N to play the public good game.
Below is the payoff calculations for the different strategies. It is important to point out the second order
punishment term B × V × N−1M−1 , where B is a constant that determines the severity of second order
punishment.
Pσ =
(
Z
N−1
)(
M−1
N−1
)
Psecond =
(
M−Y−2
N−2
)(
M−2
N−2
)
Y payoff = (Pσ.σ) + (1− Pσ).r.c.M − Z − Y − C
M − Z −B(N − 1)
V +H
M − 1 − β.
(N − 1).W +H
M − 1
X payoff = (Pσσ) + (1− Pσ).c.
(
r.
M − Z − Y − C
M − Z − 1
)
−B(N − 1)V +H
M − 1
−β. (N − 1).W
M − 1 .(1− Psecond)
Z payoff = σ
W payoff = (Pσσ) + (1− Pσ).c.
(
r.
M − Z − Y − C
M − Z − 1
)
− (N − 1).Y + C
M − 1 .γ
− (N − 1)X
M − 1 .γ.(1− Psecond)−B(N − 1)
V +H
M − 1
V payoff = (Pσσ) + (1− Pσ).
(
c.
[
r.
M − Z − Y − C
M − Z − 1
]
−G
)
The transition matrix is given by:
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
X Y Z V W
X TXX TXY TXZ TXV TXW
Y TY X TY Y TY Z TY V TYW
Z TZX TZY TZZ TZV TZW
V TV X TV Y TV Z TV V TVW
W TWX TWY TWZ TWV TWW
 (7)
Where
Tij
{
1
4µρij if i 6= j
1− 14µ
∑
k 6=i ρik if i = j
(8)
This reduces to

X Y Z V W
X 34 − 14M 14 0 0 14M
Y 0 34
1
4 0 0
Z 18 0
5
8
1
8
1
8
V 14 0 0
1
2
1
4
W 14M 0 0 0 1− 14M
 (9)
With the stationary distribution 13M+23 [6, 6, 4, 1, 3M + 6] i.e. Peer-punishers predominate. See Fig(2).
Figure 1: Stationary distributions of states as a function of imitation strength. The dashed line represents
equal distribution between the d states.
Including second order punishment leads to pool punishers dominating. Pool punishers now punish
defectors, cooperators and peer punishers for not contributing to the pool. Peer-punishers continue to
5
punish defectors and cooperators.
The main differences introduced is that there is no longer a neutral drift between cooperators and
peer punishers (ρX,W → 0), cooperators no longer invade pool-punishers (ρV,X → 0) or peer-punishers
(ρV,W → 0).
The transition matrix becomes

X Y Z V W
X 34
1
4 0 0 0
Y 0 34
1
4 0 0
Z 18 0
5
8
1
8
1
8
V 0 0 0 1 0
W 14M 0 0 0 1− 14M
 (10)
Since there is no flow out of a state of full pool-punishers, but flow into it; the stationary distribution
becomes [0, 0, 0, 1, 0]. (See Fig(2)). Thus the presence of second-order punishment of second-order free-
riders (cooperators and peer-punishers) determines whether pool-punishers or peer-punishers will prevail.
The latter outcome is preferable since pool-punishers have clear dominance, whereas without second order
punishment cooperation is susceptible to breaking down (See [4] Fig 3a, main paper)
Figure 2: Stationary distributions of states as a function of imitation strength. The dashed line represents
equal distribution between the d states.
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3 Corruptors
We now introduce a fifth strategy into the model of Sigmund et al :
Corruptors (C): A corruptor pays the central authority a fixed fee KG < G + c to avoid punishment
for defecting from the PGG. Parameter K ∈ [0, 1] here is a new parameter that controls bribe as
percentage of G, the fee paid by pool punishers (well-behaving citizens).
The payoff of corruptors is:
C payoff = (Pσσ) + (1− Pσ).
(
c.r.
M − Z − Y − C
M − Z −KG
)
− β.(N − 1)W +H
M − 1
This leads to the larger transition matrix:

X Y Z V W C
X TXX TXY TXZ TXV TXW TXC
Y TY X TY Y TY Z TY V TYW TY C
Z TZX TZY TZZ TZV TZW TZC
V TV X TV Y TV Z TV V TVW TV C
W TWX TWY TWZ TWV TWW TWC
C TCX TCY TCZ TCV TCW TCC
 (11)
3.1 Weak Pool Punishment (Low B)
When second-order punishment is weak (low values of B), peer punishers are stable with respect to
pool-punishers. Substitution for the fixation probabilities leads to

X Y Z V W C
X 35
1
5 0 0 0
1
5
Y 0 45
1
5 0 0 0
Z 110 0
7
10
1
10
1
10 0
V 0 0 0 45 0
1
5
W 15M 0 0 0 1− 15M
C 0 15
1
5 0 0
3
5
 (12)
The stationary distribution is now 1M+7 [1, 2, 2, 1,M, 1] (using a population size M = 100 this is
approximately [0.01, 0.02, 0.02, 0.01, 0.93, 0.01]) confirming clear dominance of peer-punishers.
3.2 Strong Pool Punishment (High B)
However, under extremely high second-order punishment cooperation breaks down with pool punishers
dominating followed by loners and corrupt. Modifying (12) yields

X Y Z V W C
X 25 − 15M 15 0 15 15M 15
Y 0 35
1
5
1
5 0 0
Z 110 0
7
10
1
10
1
10 0
V 0 0 0 45 0
1
5
W 15M 0 0
1
5
4
5 − 15M 0
C 0 15
1
5 0 0
3
5
 (13)
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This leads to a stationary distribution of
1
77
16 +
33(2+3M)
16(22+17M)
[
3
8
− 9(2 + 3M)
8(22 + 17M)
,
11
16
− 9(2 + 3M)
16(22 + 17M)
,
9
8
− 3(2 + 3M)
8(22 + 17M)
,
13
8
+
9(2 + 3M)
8(22 + 17M)
,
3(2 + 3M)
(22 + 17M)
, 1
]
(14)
This can be evaulated with M = 100 as [0.034, 0.114, 0.204, 0.352, 0.102, 0.193] i.e. pool-punishers
predominate, followed by loners and corruptors.
Figure 3: Stationary distributions of states as a function of pool punishment strength. As B increases
cooperation breaks down.
We see 2 very clear discontinuities at B ≈ 17 and B ≈ 40 when the proportion of peer punishers
drops to be replaced by pool-punishers. Above the first threshold, pool-punishing agents will invade peer-
punishers (ρWV → 1). Above the second threshold, pool-punishing agents will also take over defectors.
These points are explained below.
Firstly, at intermediate values of B the expected pool-punishment (calculated from the probability of
being selected with the single pool-punisher in the sample of N) is low. Therefore, the low probability of
being matched with a pool-punisher doesn’t incentivise the payment of G. However, once B is sufficiently
high, the threat of pool-punishment even from a single pool-punishing hybrid player is too high of a risk
and all non-pool-punishing strategies can be invaded by pool-punishing strategies (ρWH , ρWV → 1). The
condition for this is given by the expected cost of receiving pool-punishment when a single pool-punishing
hybrid agent is present in a population
(
N − 1
M − 1)B (15)
8
When this is equal to G it is cheaper to pay tax than to risk pool-punishment
G <
(N − 1)
M − 1 B (16)
B∗ = (
M − 1
N − 1 )G (17)
Substituting N = 5,M = 100 and G = 0.7 gives a critical value when B∗ = 17.325.
Adressing the second threshold; as the pool-punishment term becomes very large, the expected value
of pool-punishment for a homogeneous population of defectors being punished by a single pool-punisher
becomes so large that pool-punishers may invade defectors, despite the pool-punisher making a heavy
loss in the PGG.
c+G <
N − 1
M − 1B (18)
B∗ =
M − 1
N − 1 (c+G) (19)
Substituting for M,N, c and G gives B∗ = 42.075.
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4 Corruptors and Hybrid Punishers
Finally, we add Hybrid-Punishers (H) to the set of possible strategies.
Hybrid-Punishers (H): These players participate and contribute to the PGG (cooperate), pay a fixed
cost per defector γ, and pay a fixed a prior cost G toward a punishment pool.
The payoff of hybrid punishers is then defined by the following equation:
H payoff = (Pσσ) + (1− Pσ).
(
c.
[
r.
M − Z − Y − C
M − Z − 1
]
−G
)
− (N − 1).Y + C
M − 1 .γ
We now have the following transition matrix.

X Y Z V W C H
X TXX TXY TXZ TXV TXW TXC TXH
Y TY X TY Y TY Z TY V TYW TY C TY H
Z TZX TZY TZZ TZV TZW TZC TZH
V TV X TV Y TV Z TV V TVW TV C TV H
W TWX TWY TWZ TWV TWW TWC TWH
C TCX TCY TCZ TCV TCW TCC TCH
H THX THY THZ THV THW THC THH

(20)
4.1 Weak Pool Punishment (Low B)
Assuming a low value of B, results in the transition matrix below.

X Y Z V W C H
X 36 − 16M 16 0 16 16M 16 0
Y 0 46
1
6
1
6 0 0 0
Z 112 0
9
12
1
12
1
12 0 0
V 0 0 0 56 − 16M 0 16 16M
W 16M 0 0 0 1− 16M 0 0
C 0 16
1
6 0 0
2
3 0
H 16
1
6
1
6
1
6M
1
6
1
6
1
6 − 16M

(21)
The stationary distribution in this case is given as
1
Γ
[
24
13
+
15M
13
,
31
15
+
55M
26
,
46
13
+
45M
13
, 1 + 5M, 3(16 + 34M + 15M2, 5(5 + 8M)), 1
]
(22)
Where the normalisation factor is given as
Γ =
127
13
+
305M
26
+
5
13
(5 + 8M) +
3
26
(16 + 34M + 15M2) (23)
This evaluates to [0.01, 0.017, 0.016, 0.008, 0.94, 0.006, 0.001]. Peer punishers overwhelmingly predom-
inate, followed by defectors, loners and cooperators (agrees with low B limit of Fig 4 of corruption paper).
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4.2 Strong Pool Punishment (High B)
When B is very large the transition matrix becomes

X Y Z V W C H
X 26 − 16M 16 0 16 16M 16 16
Y 0 46
1
6
1
6 0 0 0
Z 112 0
2
3
1
12
1
12 0
1
12
V 0 0 0 56 − 16M 0 16 16M
W 16M 0 0 0
5
6 − 16M 0 16
C 0 16
1
6 0 0
2
3 0
H 0 0 0 16M 0 0 1− 16M

(24)
The stationary distribution can be expressed as
1
Γ
[
3(2 +M)
(70 + 86M + 27M2)
,
−22− 17M
(70 + 86M + 27M2)
,
6(5 + 4M)
(70 + 86M + 27M2)
,
−70− 59M
(70 + 86M + 27M2)
,
6(1 + 2M)
(70 + 86M + 27M2)
,
−38− 31M
(70 + 86M + 27M2)
, 1
]
(25)
Where the normalisation factor is given as
Γ =
1
1− −70−59M70+86M+27M2 − −38−31M70+86M+27M2 − −22−17M70+86M+27M2 − 3(2+M)70+86M+27M2 − 6(1+2M)70+86M+27M2
− 6(5+4M)70+86M+27M2
(26)
With the stationary distribution as follows [0.001, 0.0059, 0.008, 0.020, 0.004, 0.011, 0.950]; hybrid pun-
ishers predominate (in agreement with the high B limit of Fig 4 of corruption paper). The proportions
are plotted as a function of B below in Fig (4.2).
We see 2 very clear discontinuities at B ≈ 0.2 and B ≈ 17 when the proportion of peer punishers
drops to be replaced by hybrid strategies. Above the first threshold; hybrid strategies may no longer
be invaded by peer-punishers (ρHW → 0). Above the second threshold, hybrid agents will also invade
peer-punishers (ρWH → 1). The explanation for the second threshold is the same as section 3 and the
first threshold is explained below.
For a single peer-punishing mutant to invade hybrid players, the saving from paying the tax G must
outweigh any possible second order pool-punishment. Since, apart from the mutant herself, only pool-
punishers are present this has an expected value of B(N − 1) i.e. punishment from all the other players
in the sample.
G < B(N − 1) (27)
Leading to a threshold value for B∗ = 0.175.
The transition matrix in (24) also shows that when second-order punishment is strong, hybrid punish-
ers are only destablized by neutral drift towards pool-punishers, who can then be exploited by corruptors.
One interpretation is that this form of instability represents a risk that exists in the real world. When
11
Figure 4: Stationary distributions of states as a function of pool punishment strength. As B increases
hybrid punishers become dominant.
there is high cooperation, individuals might become lax in their propensity to altruistically punish de-
fection, and this can destablize cooperation. As mentioned in the main text, this risk may motivate
goverments to sometimes mandate that citizens to sign up for certain peer punishment duties, like jury
duty, and punish those who merely pay their taxes. If pool-punishers were also punished by second-order
punishment, then there would be no neutral drift towards this strategy, and the stationary distribution
would be [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1], as there would be no flows away from the hybrid punisher state.
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